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Fiduciary Principles in Family Law
Elizabeth S. Scott and Ben Chen
I. Introduction
Family members bear primary responsibility for the care of dependent and vulnerable
individuals in our society, and therefore family relationships are infused with fiduciary
obligation. Most importantly, the legal relationship between parents and their minor children is
best understood as one that is regulated by fiduciary principles. Husbands and wives relate to one
another as equals under contemporary law, but this relationship as well is subject to duties of
care and loyalty when either spouse is in a condition of dependency. Finally, if an adult is
severely intellectually disabled or becomes incapacitated and in need of a guardian, a family
member is often preferred to serve in this role.
This chapter examines the application of fiduciary principles and doctrine to close family
relationships. The chapter explains that the parent-child and spousal relationships are governed
by fiduciary principles and duties, but that enforcement of these duties [at least when family
relationships are intact] is largely accomplished through informal bonding and monitoring
mechanisms. In contrast, when family members become guardians of adult relatives, fiduciary
law applies with minimal recognition of the family bond and obligations are formally enforced.
The chapter examines the rationales for these contrasting approaches and questions whether
adjustments are indicated.
Our analysis focuses first on the regulation of intact family relationships. The relationship
between parents and minor children fits intrinsically into a fiduciary framework.1 Parents have
the challenging responsibility of caring for their children over the period of their minority and of
preparing them to become independent adults. Society has a critical stake in parents’ successful
performance of the many tasks that inhere in their role, and success is possible only if parents act
to promote their children’s interests. But the law usually assumes that the interests of parents and
children are aligned, and it relies heavily on informal regulatory incentives and oversight with
modest formal enforcement in intact families. In general, only when parents default seriously in
1
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fulfilling their parental duties, or the family dissolves, is the parent-child relationship subject to
formal enforcement. This approach aims, with relative success, to restrain parents from pursuing
selfish interests, while protecting family privacy and motivating parents to provide the care
needed by children. Spouses also have fiduciary obligations to one another, obligations that are
in tension with the contemporary liberal model of marriage. Spousal duties of loyalty and care,
even more than those of parents, are enforced informally in intact marriage; legal enforcement is
limited to divorce and death. As with the parent-child relationship, greater use of formal
enforcement during marriage seems unlikely to improve performance.
The law’s approach changes dramatically when adult family members are incapacitated
and in need of care. Appointed family guardians are typically parents (for intellectually-disabled
adults) or adult children or spouses (for incapacitated elderly persons). In this setting, the legal
presumption that close family members have aligned interests becomes attenuated. Regulators
give some recognition to the family bond that is the basis of the guardianship, but often employ
formal bonding and monitoring mechanisms in the form of conflict of interest rules and reporting
requirements; these restrictions aim to prevent guardians generally from acting contrary to the
interest of the incapacitated adult. In the context of close, ongoing relationships between the
adult and her guardian, these burdens can sometimes be costly. The chapter concludes by
suggesting that modest relaxation of formal fiduciary obligations in this context can sometimes
serve the interests of the adult by supporting her relationship with the family guardian.
II. Parents as Fiduciaries
On first inspection, the description of parents as fiduciaries may seem inapt, given the
deeply embedded deference to parental rights in American law.2 Protection of parental rights
continues to be robust, despite a shift in recent decades toward a regime that focuses more
directly on children’s welfare. Some contemporary critics view the rights of parents and the
interests of children as inherently conflicting, and assume that children would benefit from
greater state oversight of families and restrictions on parental authority.3 But this apparent
conflict is much diminished if this legal relationship is analyzed in a fiduciary framework in
which parents’ duty to care for their children dominates and parental authority is contingent on
2
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satisfactory fulfillment of essential parental obligations. In this framework, properly limited
parental rights facilitate adequate performance by parents and serve the law’s interest in
promoting children’s welfare.
Indeed, the parent-child relationship shares much in common with other fiduciary
relationships, such as guardianships, trusts, and relationships between corporate directors and
shareholders. Like other fiduciaries, parents are agents who hold asymmetric power and wield
substantial discretionary authority in a relationship that aims to benefit the principal. And like
other principals, children are vulnerable and not in a position to supervise or control parental
performance. Here, as in other fiduciary contexts, the goal of legal regulation is to encourage the
parent to serve the child’s interest, and to do so under conditions in which monitoring is
difficult.4
Some features of the parent-child relationship distinguish it from other fiduciary
affiliations and pose particular challenges for legal regulation.5 This family relationship is
broader in scope than are most other fiduciary bonds; parents must perform a wide range of tasks
in many spheres that pervade their lives and those of their children. Moreover, intimate family
relationships require privacy to flourish to a greater extent than do other fiduciary relationships.
Thus, formal monitoring of parental performance can be costly. Further, unlike other fiduciaries,
parents receive no compensation for fulfilling their duties; their reward comes from nonpecuniary role satisfaction. Finally, the parent-child relationship, once established, has intrinsic
value for the child and is not readily replaced even if parental performance is suboptimal.
The law’s effort to encourage satisfactory parental performance is shaped by these unique
qualities, but it is implemented through mechanisms that are familiar in other fiduciary contexts.
As agency theory explains, the law employs two means of reducing conflicts of interest between
agents and principals. Bonding mechanisms encourage agents to align their interests with those
of their principals, while monitoring mechanisms facilitate oversight of agents’ behavior to
detect selfishness or shirking.6 In a fiduciary framework, much regulation of the parent-child
relationship can be understood as serving either bonding or monitoring functions, and both extralegal and formal legal arrangements are used in various combinations to achieve regulatory
4
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goals. Extra-legal mechanisms predominate in the regulation of intact families. More costly and
intrusive legal regulation is limited to situations in which parents seriously default or societal
consensus dictates that parental discretion should be preempted through mandatory rules. But
when the family is fractured, the assumption that parents usually act in their children’s interest
becomes weaker and formal legal constraints substitute for informal mechanisms.
A. Regulating Parents in Intact Families.
For the biological parent living with a child, fiduciary obligations begin at the child’s
birth, with no formal appointment or (typically) evaluation of whether the parent will be a
suitable guardian who is capable of fulfilling the broad obligations of the parental role. (When a
child is adopted, in contrast, a rigorous process determines the parent’s suitability for
parenthood.) The law generally presumes that legal parents will act in the child’s best interest
and adequately fulfill the many obligations that inhere in the role. Given the strong tradition of
parental rights and the asymmetric nature of the parent-child relationship, this presumption may
seem puzzling. Why are parents generally trusted to put their duty to their children above their
selfish interests with far less state supervision than applies to other fiduciaries?
1. Extra-legal enforcement limiting conflicts of interest.
Due to two unique aspects of the parent-child relationship, most parents are effectively
motivated to serve their children’s interest through powerful extra-legal mechanisms that usually
are far stronger than in other fiduciary contexts. First, in contrast to other fiduciaries, most
parents love their children and want to promote their welfare; for many parents, the parental role
is central to social and personal identity. This powerful affective bond is assumed to lead parents
to fulfill duties of care and loyalty. Second, strong informal social norms regulate parental
behavior more effectively than is possible in other fiduciary contexts. Courts generally
conceptualize the fiduciary role as one infused with a sense of moral obligation that distinguishes
fiduciaries from most commercial agents.7 In other contexts, this norm is largely a legal
construction, but parental norms operate independently of law and are broadly enforced in
society. Parents expect to receive approval from family, friends, and community for good
parenting and informal sanctions (in the form of gossip or social exclusion) if they default.
Good-parenting norms are internalized by parents, who predictably will experience feelings of
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guilt for shirking or selfish behavior.8 Thus the affective ties that define the parent-child
relationship, together with informal social norms, serve extra-legal bonding and monitoring
functions that align interests of parents and children; these mechanisms are relatively effective
and also less costly to enforce than legal regulation.
Informal monitoring and bonding mechanisms also avoid costs that render legal
enforcement particularly burdensome in this context. Parental discretionary authority and family
privacy are critically important to promote flourishing family relationships. In contrast to
fiduciaries in many other contexts, who focus on a narrow range of financial decisions, parents
make a broad range of complex decisions affecting every aspect of their children’s lives.
Moreover, the interests of parents and children are inevitably intertwined; many decisions affect
parents as well as children. Thus, a strict conflict of interest rule prohibiting self-interested
choices by parents would be unmanageable. The law recognizes that parents need substantial
discretion to perform their role, and effectively accords parents in (most) intact families a
presumption of good faith and due diligence.9 The law also presumes that parents can cooperate
and resolve disputes about decisions affecting their children without state intervention. This
deferential approach is analogous to the business judgment rule governing corporate directors
and managers, who similarly perform a broad range of tasks and require substantial discretion to
fulfill their fiduciary duties.10 As such, it might be described as a “parental judgment” standard.
Deference to parental judgment is important for another reason as well. Parents receive
no compensation for their services; their reward comes in the form of non-pecuniary role
satisfaction. Much of this satisfaction is intrinsically derived from the rewarding nature of the
relationship itself, but legal and societal deference and respect for the important function parents
serve also contribute to role satisfaction. Onerous burdens or intrusive state oversight through
elaborate reporting requirements would likely undermine the satisfaction parents derive from a
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role that requires substantial dedication. Given the assumption that strict supervision is usually
unnecessary to induce satisfactory performance, parents are given substantial freedom to raise
their children according to their own values so long as the child’s welfare is not threatened.
2. Legal enforcement of parents’ fiduciary duties.
Of course, extra-legal mechanisms are not always adequate to encourage parents to act to
promote their children’s interests. To mitigate conflicts of interest, legal mechanisms restricting
parental discretion are invoked in two situations. First, the state will intervene under its abuse/
neglect jurisdiction if parents seriously default on their duties to care for their children. Second,
preemptive legal rules limit parental authority when a societal consensus dictates that violation
of the rule potentially harms children and undermines social welfare. Under both conditions, the
prohibited parental conduct or decision is deemed unreasonable and beyond the broad authority
afforded by the parental judgment rule.
Parental neglect or maltreatment demonstrates that the informal controls encouraging
parents to prioritize the child’s interest have failed. At that point, the state steps in, subjecting
parents to formal oversight and restricting their authority. Given the privacy of family
relationships, detection and monitoring of parental neglect or maltreatment pose challenges.11
Detection is implemented through child-abuse reporting statutes in every state, which monitor
families by imposing a duty to report suspected child abuse on professionals who interact with
children, such as physicians, teachers, child care workers, and therapists.12 Reporting by nonprofessionals is facilitated as well; neighbors and community members can report suspected
maltreatment to state social services agencies, triggering an investigation. If neglect or abuse is
established, parental authority is restricted; the parent is subject to state supervision and
monitoring and may be directed to participate in programs to promote improved parenting.
Narrow statutory enactments also preempt parental authority under the state’s police
power, regulating parental behavior in several domains to protect children’s health and safety
and assure that they receive sufficient education to become productive adults. Categorical
restrictions on parental authority include compulsory school attendance laws, curfew laws, child
labor prohibitions, vaccination requirements, and minimum age restrictions on driving and
drinking alcoholic beverages. These rules represent a societal consensus that children’s welfare
11
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demands conformity to the prescribed directive and that a contrary choice by parents is an
unreasonable exercise of discretion and a breach of parental obligation. Preemptive rules embody
a legislative judgment about the limits of reasonable parental discretion and about necessary
conditions for children’s healthy development.
3. The function of parental rights.
Family law’s robust protection of parental rights can be incorporated into a fiduciary
framework to a substantial extent. In a regime that offers no financial compensation for the
fulfillment of parental responsibilities, parental rights are offered as a quid pro quo for
satisfactory performance. Parental rights are conferred ex ante, embodied in parents’
discretionary authority and supported by the presumption of good faith and due diligence. These
rights are limited by rules preempting parental authority and they can be withdrawn if parents
seriously default. Parental rights in some form are a necessary element of a regime that aims to
encourage parents’ best efforts to pursue their children’s interests.
Excessive emphasis on parental rights as the lynchpin of the parent-child relationship
carries costs, however. “Rights talk” can undermine the law’s goals by potentially weakening the
normative signals associated with parental responsibility.13 Further, the rhetoric of parental rights
encourages parents to consider their own selfish interests rather than those of their children, and
thus increases the potential for conflicts of interest. Moreover, the tendency to balance parental
rights against child welfare undermines the aim of aligning parents’ interests with those of their
children. In recent years, a reformulation of legal rhetoric has ameliorated these negative effects
by focusing on parental obligations and by underscoring the critical link between parental rights
and responsibilities. Correctly understood, parental rights embody the respect and discretion
needed to fulfill this important societal role.
i. Regulating parents outside the intact family.
Regulation of non-custodial parents and their children extends to a diverse set of family
relationships: these include divorced or separated parents; parents who have lost custody due to
abuse and neglect; and parents (usually unmarried fathers) who have never lived with their
children. It may seem curious to classify these parents as fiduciaries at all; non-custodial parents
generally perform a limited caretaking role and those who have lost custody to the state have
demonstrated severe inadequacy in fulfilling their obligations. But if the parent and child have an
13

See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 76-101 (1991).

7

established bond, the relationship usually warrants legal protection because it very likely has
substantial intrinsic value to the child. Thus, although non-custodial parents have fewer
obligations and more limited discretionary authority, the law has an interest in encouraging these
parents to fulfill their obligations and to act in their children’s interests.
In achieving this goal, formal legal monitoring and bonding mechanisms often supplant
the extra-legal mechanisms that predominate in regulating parents in intact families. A noncustodial parent may have weaker bonds with the child than do parents and children in intact
families, and thus may be less motivated to prioritize the child’s welfare. The relationship
rewards are often reduced, along with parent’s legal authority. Further, non-custodial parents
may not be a part of the child’s community, reducing the effectiveness of informal social norms
in regulating parental behavior. Finally, parents’ ability to cooperate with each other and resolve
disputes informally is no longer assumed. Under these conditions, non-custodial parents may be
inclined to pursue selfish ends that conflict with the child’s interest, and legal enforcement
mechanisms may substitute for affective bonds and informal social norms to assure the
fulfillment of parental duties.
An example demonstrates this point. All parents have the obligation to provide for their
children’s needs with financial support. In intact families, the duty is not legally enforced. It is
assumed that parents and children’s interests are aligned and that informal norms will motivate
parents to fulfill this obligation. Upon divorce, however (or when a parent has never lived with
the child, in the case of the unmarried father), the non-custodial parent is subject to a formal
child support order enforced through legal sanctions.14 Substantial evidence supports the need for
formal enforcement, indicating that these parents are less effectively influenced by informal
social norms to voluntarily provide financial support.
Legal efforts to encourage non-custodial parents to fulfill their fiduciary duties include a
combination of sticks and carrots. To encourage satisfactory performance, divorced parents and
those with children in state custody are subject to more extensive state supervision and
monitoring than parents in intact families. When parents divorce, a court order dictates custody
arrangements, allocating time with the child, financial support, and specific duties to provide
services needed by the child (school tuition payments, for example). Parents whose children are

14
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in state custody are subject to intensive supervision requiring them to remediate the behavior and
conditions that led to the child’s removal from their custody. Child protective service agencies
oversee parent-child interaction and monitor compliance with the requirements of the foster care
plan.15 Progress is subject to periodic judicial review, and failure to remediate can result in
termination of parental rights.
Non-custodial parents are also encouraged to fulfill parental duties through legal
responses that seek to reward their efforts and enhance role satisfaction. Three examples make
this point. First, in many states, shared legal custody is the preferred arrangement for divorced or
separated parents. Shared custody signals that both parents enjoy and deserve full parental status
with attendant rights and responsibilities.16 The arrangement avoids disenfranchisement of noncustodial parents, and also presumably avoids the parent’s disengagement from the parent-child
relationship that often followed under traditional custody law. Second, parents who have lost
custody to the state continue to have contact with their children in foster care and can regain
custody through effective remedial efforts. Finally, non-custodial parents cannot lose parental
rights so long as they fulfill their parental obligations and maintain a relationship with the child.
Even unmarried parents who have never lived with their children can retain their parental status
through efforts to establish a relationship and assume parental responsibilities.17 Thus, the legal
conception of reciprocal parental rights and responsibilities operates in the regulation of noncustodial parents as well as parents in intact families.
ii. Termination of parental rights.
In most fiduciary contexts, a serious violation of the duty of care or loyalty results in
dismissal and replacement with a new un-conflicted fiduciary. In the family context, however,
the relationship with a parent is assumed to have intrinsic value to the child. Outside the context
of adoption, parents cannot easily abandon their responsibilities, nor can the state readily sever
the bond and substitute a new parent. Because parents are not fungible, termination of parental
rights is deemed an extreme measure, even when the parent has defaulted on his or her duties.
Thus, the termination decision is subject to substantive and procedural requirements that
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recognize the importance of the relationship to both parents and child.18 This response is
appropriate if parents are likely to assume parental responsibilities in a reasonable time or if
maintaining the relationship with even a deficient parent has value for the child. But obstacles to
termination should not be driven primarily by a rigid deference to parental rights. If the
likelihood that parents can resume responsibilities is remote, the child’s interest may be
promoted by termination, along with the assumption of parental duties by another adult who will
act with due diligence to provide care.
III. Spouses and Intimate Partners
Fiduciary principles are applied more sparingly to the regulation of other family
relationships than to the relationship of parent and child. Informal social norms establish a duty
of loyalty and care between spouses that likely motivates each spouse to prioritize the other’s
interest, but legal enforcement of the duty to care for a dependent spouse or to avoid self-dealing
is limited to the context of divorce or death. To some extent, the contemporary liberal model of
marriage has eroded fiduciary principles, insisting that spouses have few responsibilities to one
another. Under modern law, legal protection of vulnerable or dependent spouses arises in the
regulation of spousal support and distribution of marital property on divorce and in the spousal
right to an elective forced share at death. Also, the common law necessaries doctrine and the
testamentary marital privilege could also be seen as grounded in a duty of loyalty.19 But in the
era of no-fault divorce, other sanctions for breach of marital obligations are few. Unmarried
intimate partners may undertake contractual duties to one another, but otherwise have no special
obligations to care for each other’s dependency needs.
A. Liberal marriage and fiduciary obligation.
Through the exchange of marriage vows, spouses promise loyalty and mutual care “in
sickness and in health,” and in an idealized form, each spouse prioritizes the other’s interest
above selfish concerns. Moreover, powerful social norms motivate spouses to care for one
another during periods of dependency, such as childbirth, illness, and old age. Not surprisingly,
when an elderly person becomes incapacitated and needs a guardian, a competent spouse is
likely to be appointed . Indeed, the role of spouses in caring for each other’s dependency needs
and relieving society of that burden is one justification for the privileged legal status of
18
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marriage.20 However, under contemporary law, spouses are free to divorce for self-interested
reasons, with no direct sanctions for violations of the duties of care and loyalty.
Liberal marriage has replaced a traditional model that may appear to have fit more
comfortably in a fiduciary framework. Under traditional law, for example, violations of the duty
of loyalty (adultery, cruelty) and duty of care (desertion) were grounds for divorce. Moreover,
the wife, like the principal in fiduciary relationships, was dependent, vulnerable, and presumed
to be incapable of acting in furtherance of her own interests; the husband was financially
responsible for his wife’s care and authorized to make decisions affecting her welfare. But
husbands were not encouraged to prioritize the interests of their wives over their own interest. To
the contrary, the wife’s identity and interest were subsumed upon marriage into that of the
husband, and her legal status was subordinate to his. According to the adage, “The husband and
wife are one and the husband is the one.”21
The modern legal framework thoroughly rejects this hierarchy, and legal doctrines have
been reformed to embrace a strong spousal equality principle. Further, in elevating wives from
their former subordinated status, modern reforms have tended to make individual autonomy a
core principle in defining the spousal relationship. This model is far more compatible with
contemporary values than its predecessor, but the primacy of autonomy as a defining principle
has not been wholly satisfactory in marriage regulation. Although fiduciary principles play a
role in regulating marriage, the liberal model does not emphasize mutual responsibility and only
modestly reinforces social norms of spousal care and loyalty. The law of property distribution
and spousal support provide some protection of dependent spouses on divorce, but dependency
grounded in marital roles is presumed to create only limited obligation in the other spouse.
B. The necessaries doctrine and conflicting principles.
Recent reforms of the common law necessaries doctrine capture the challenge lawmakers
face in modernizing marriage law to conform to contemporary values. At common law, husbands
were liable to third parties for expenses incurred by their wives for necessaries, a category that
includes food, clothing, medical treatment, and shelter. Liability was based on the husband’s
obligation to provide financial support to his wife. Modern courts, applying the equality
principle, have been have been required to determine whether to abolish the doctrine, absolving
20
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both spouses of liability, or to extend liability for necessaries to both spouses. Courts favoring
abolition implicitly embrace the liberal model of marriage, viewing the spouses as independent
agents with few special obligations to one another, even for basic needs.22 Courts extending
liability for necessaries to wives view marriage as a relationship of mutual obligation in which
each spouse has a duty to care for the other and provide for basic needs.23 Implicit in this choice
is a judgment about the extent to which fiduciary principles apply to marriage.
C. Marital property and spousal support.
Fiduciary principles influence the ownership of property during marriage in some states,
and property distribution on divorce in most jurisdictions. In community property states,
marriage is a partnership in which homemaker and earning spouses are presumed to contribute
equally. All property acquired during marriage belongs to the marital community, and an
individual spouse managing community property acts as a fiduciary for the community and not
as a self-interested party. When a couple divorces, community property is divided between
them.24 In former common-law property states, spouses can hold title to, manage, and transfer
property as individuals during marriage, but at the time of divorce, property acquired during
marriage becomes marital property to be divided equitably (although not necessarily equally)
between the spouses.25 Both regimes value spouses’ non-monetary contributions to the marriage,
recognizing the vulnerability of financially dependent spouses and offering protection.
Divorce law recognizes that social norms promoting care, loyalty, and cooperation during
marriage erode when the marriage dissolves and spouses no longer share aligned interests.
Conflict of interest rules seek to deter selfish behavior. Even in common law states, spouses have
a duty to disclose all assets prior to divorce so that the court can accurately determine the fair
distribution of property. Moreover, although spouses generally are free to spend and transfer
assets during marriage, dissipation of assets in contemplation of divorce by one spouse will be
sanctioned by the court in distributing property.26 Interestingly, divorcing spouses are presumed
to be bound by a duty of loyalty derived from the marriage, despite the reality that both are
usually motivated by self-interest and understand that their interests are in conflict. In contrast, a
couple executing a premarital contract are assumed to be negotiating at arms-length, although
22
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one party is often unrepresented by counsel and unaware that the other may aim to protect his or
her self-interest. Courts have held that before marriage, engaged parties have no fiduciary duties
to one another.27
In many marriages, spouses assume specialized roles that leave the homemaker spouse
financially vulnerable on divorce. In this situation, the earning spouse can be subject to a legal
spousal support order post-divorce until the dependent spouse attains financial self-sufficiency.
This order formalizes the obligation that the earning spouse presumably undertook willingly
during marriage when the parties’ interests were aligned. After divorce, legal enforcement is
required to assure that the obligation is fulfilled and to prevent selfish behavior. The duration and
amount of spousal support depends on the payor spouse’s earnings, and also on the length of the
marriage and the dependent spouse’s prospects for self-sufficiency. The obligation may extend
indefinitely if the dependent spouse has become disabled during the marriage or has dim
prospects for employment after a long marriage due to age. This obligation is based on a
fiduciary duty of care grounded in the marriage relationship. But these cases are increasingly
rare. Under the liberal model of marriage, divorce represents a clean break that promises each
spouse the freedom to pursue personal goals. Modern courts are reluctant to recognize ongoing
post-divorce obligations grounded in past marital roles. Short-term alimony has become the
legal norm, with the expectation that dependent spouses can attain self-sufficiency relatively
quickly.28 As many scholars have recognized, this approach systematically disadvantages
homemakers in long-term marriages.29 The implicit promise of financial support when the
spouses assumed differentiated marital roles is subject to limited legal enforcement.
D. Unmarried partners.
An unmarried cohabiting couple can contract to assume mutual obligations that afford
financial protection to a vulnerable partner when the relationship ends.30 Such contracts can
provide for property sharing and ongoing financial support for a dependent partner. In many
states, both express contracts and contracts implied in fact can be enforced, although determining
promissory conduct often proves difficult.31 But unmarried partners have no fiduciary obligations
27
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derived from their intimate relationship, even one of long duration. In the absence of contract, no
legal basis exists to impose fiduciary duties on one partner for the benefit of the other. Indeed,
the choice not to marry is taken to represent a choice not to be bound by legally enforceable
relationship duties, even in long-term marriage-like unions.32
IV. Family Guardianships: The Formalization of Fiduciary Duties
When an adult is unable to care for herself or make self-interested decisions due to
cognitive incapacity or other causes, a court may appoint a legal guardian to manage her person
or estate if her needs cannot be met by less restrictive alternatives.33 The relationship between an
adult subject to guardianship and her guardian is a prototypical fiduciary relationship: legal
regulation aims to protect a vulnerable and dependent individual who is presumed unable to
assert her own interests from overreaching and self-dealing by the guardian. To accomplish this
end and enforce the duties of care and loyalty, guardians, like other fiduciaries, ordinarily are
subject to state oversight in the form of extensive reporting and accounting obligations. See
Chapter _. Courts also often apply strict conflict of interest rules to regulate guardians, especially
those who manage estates. This part examines the regulation of family guardians, focusing on
surrogacy law’s very different treatment of these relationships from the law’s response in other
family contexts.
A. The Need for Special Protections in Formal Fiduciary Relationships
Surrogacy law recognizes close family bonds in the appointment of guardians; often the
preferred guardian is a spouse or an adult child of an elderly parent, who presumably shares an
intimate family relationship with the individual.34 But family guardianships are not subject to
the presumed alignment of interests that the relationship between parents and minor children and
(competent) spouses enjoy. Although the relational bond receives some recognition under
surrogacy law, family guardians largely are subject to the same restrictive regulatory framework
as other guardians. Unlike a typical parent of a minor child, a family guardian owes legally
enforceable fiduciary duties – including extensive accounting and reporting duties and the duty
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to avoid substantial conflicts of interest.35 Procedures enabling prior judicial authorization of
transactions that benefit the guardian provide partial accommodation of family relationships in
many states, but family guardians who lack the sophistication to follow these procedures may
violate fiduciary duties at great cost to themselves and to their relationships with their
dependents.
While many parents and children retain a close emotional bond for their mutual lives,
extra-legal mechanisms deterring selfish behavior are deemed inadequate when a family member
(including a child) is appointed guardian for an adult. This response derives from differences
between incapacitated adults and minor children, and from presumed differences between these
family relationships and those of parent and minor child. Adult children usually no longer live
with their parents and have their own interests and concerns, including their own nuclear
families. Moreover, unlike the typical parent of a minor child, the guardian may have an
expectation of financial gain on the death of the incapacitated family member that creates a
potential conflict of interest in the expenditure of guardianship assets. Informal monitoring of the
guardian’s care may be difficult in this setting as the protected adult may have less contact with
professionals than would a minor child. Further, the potential for conflict among adult siblings
about a parent’s care may be less subject to informal resolution than disagreements between
parents or spouses in intact families.
Another consideration also weighs against giving broad discretionary authority to the
guardian of an adult. Unlike a child, an elderly person typically has lived a life in which she has
acquired a stable identity with established values and preferences. She has an interest in selfdetermination that she is not able to realize personally. Thus, the guardian’s role, to the extent
possible, is to make decisions consistent with the elderly person’s self-defined interest, a
constraint that appropriately limits the guardian’s authority. Relatedly, an adult subject to
guardianship has a dignitary interest in personhood that exists only in nascent form in childhood.
This interest warrants respect, and it is threatened when another person assumes decision-making
authority over important aspects of the individual’s life. In sum, the state’s interest in deterring
selfish behavior by the family guardian is substantial, and this relationship may be less amenable
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to regulation through extra-legal bonding and monitoring mechanisms than the parent-(minor)
child relationship.
These considerations warrant vigilance to avoid conflicts of interest by the guardian in
many cases, but may impose undue burdens on the parties in some family guardianships. Many
incapacitated individuals are in close relationships with their family guardians, with a long
history of care by the guardian and intertwined interests, including the sharing of resources. In
this situation, the rigid imposition of conflict of interest rules can result in outcomes that may
clash with the interest and preferences of the protected adult, based on her past choices. A
presumption of good faith and due diligence might be appropriate in these cases, together with
the careful application of a substituted judgment standard to evaluate apparent conflicts.
B. Appointment.
In most states, a close family member is preferred over other potential guardians and,36 in
some, spouses and children are preferred over other relatives.37 This reflects an appreciation for
the importance of family bonds and an assumption that these bonds will reduce self-interested
behavior by the guardian. But courts have broad discretion in appointing a guardian, and often no
legal presumption favoring family members constrains the court’s decision.38 Courts choose nonfamily guardians in several situations. If the individual herself objects to the petitioner or family
members seriously disagree about the appointment, a neutral outsider may be appointed.39 The
latter conflict sometimes arises when children of an elderly person object to a sibling’s or
spouse’s appointment. In other cases, the petitioner may lack the expertise to manage substantial
or complex estates, leading to the appointment of a professional guardian.40 The family petitioner
may be a distant relative who lacks close bonds with the incapacitated adult; in this case, no
special preference seems warranted.
These seem like sound reasons for rejecting a family petitioner, but courts sometimes
decline to appoint a close family member simply because she has an expectation of inheritance
(especially if other potential heirs object), on the ground that this creates a potential conflict of
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interest.41 Some states go further to disqualify any relative who does not renounce her preexisting interests in the guardianship estate.42 This response discounts the likely value to the
protected adult of a close family relationship with the guardian and ignores her preferences
expressed before she became incapacitated. In some cases, ignoring the relational bond between
spouses, siblings, or parent and child may result in the appointment of a neutral, but sub-optimal,
guardian, not motivated by affective bonds to exercise due diligence and act in the interest of the
adult subject to guardianship.43
The appointment of a guardian severely curtails the individual’s personal autonomy and
therefore directly implicates her liberty interest. For this reason, the appointment proceeding is
subject to rigorous due process requirements; these are discussed in Chapter _. Thus, even if the
petitioner is a spouse or adult child who has cared for (and even lived with) the incapacitated
person, due process protections apply to the decision of whether she is so incapacitated that a
guardianship is needed and, if so, what is the extent of that incapacity. But once this
determination is made, a presumption favoring a close family member as guardian, so long as the
incapacitated adult is amenable, would often seem to be in her interest.
C. Compensation.
Guardianship statutes typically allow a family guardian, like other guardians, to receive
reasonable compensation for her services from the guardianship estate.44 Allowing the family
guardian to receive compensation (to the extent permitted by the value of guardianship estate)
formalizes the guardianship relationship. This indicates that lawmakers deem the relationship
rewards and extra-legal enforcement mechanisms that operate effectively in the context of the
parent-child relationship to be insufficient to induce the guardian to faithfully perform her duties
with due diligence. As in other formal fiduciary contexts, financial compensation is deemed
41
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necessary to encourage diligent performance and inculcates seriousness about the responsibilities
of the role.45 Unlike professional guardians, however, family guardians often do not ask for or
receive compensation, suggesting that they understand the relationship to be grounded in family
bonds.46
D. Scope of Powers and Limits.
Once appointed, all guardians, including family members, are subject to a complex
regime of legal regulations made up of formal bonding and monitoring regulations that aim to
reduce self-interested behavior and shirking and to promote due diligence. A family guardian
owes formal fiduciary duties of loyalty and care47 and is also subject to accounting and reporting
duties to which all guardians are subject. Further, she can be subject to the same sanctions for a
breach of duty as other guardians, including restitution of property or funds acquired in breach of
duty48 or removal from office.49
1. Monitoring.
Family guardians are subject to state monitoring similar to the regime that protects
children from parental default. Adult protective service statutes in most states establish a system
of reporting, investigation, and intervention designed to protect vulnerable elderly and disabled
individuals (whether or not they are in a formal guardianship) from abuse or neglect.50 These
statutes often require professionals such as physicians to report guardians suspected of abuse or
neglect.51 But even with no indication of misconduct, the monitoring of guardians, even close
family members, is far more extensive than the oversight of parents. Guardianship statutes
typically require the filing of detailed reports shortly after appointment, periodically for the
duration of the guardianship, and when the guardianship terminates.52 See Chapter _. While these
requirements can be fulfilled easily by professional guardians, family guardians often complain
45
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about the time and costs of compliance.53 In part, extensive state monitoring requirements reflect
concerns for the protected person’s autonomy interest.54 But these requirements also indicate a
view that guardians require extensive oversight to prevent self-interested behavior or shirking,
and that these concerns are as salient for family guardians as for others. Implicitly, the adoption
of demanding reporting requirements indicates that the less costly extra-legal mechanisms that
regulate the parent-child relationship are deemed inadequate to reduce perverse incentives.
2. Conflict of Interest Rules.
Courts often apply strict conflict of interest rules to prohibit guardians from acting other
than in the sole interest of the protected person. The common law of most states also presumes
that a self-dealing transaction between the guardian and the incapacitated individual is the result
of undue influence by the guardian.55 These rules usually function well to deter selfish behavior,
but in cases involving close family relationships, strict enforcement can ignore intertwined
financial interests and violate the wishes and preferences of the adult subject to guardianship, as
indicated by her acts and decisions before incapacitation. Courts have considered whether
incapacity vitiates prior understandings; some courts have relaxed these rules to accommodate
pre-appointment understandings or practices between family members, while others have felt
bound by prohibitions against self-dealing by the guardian, despite evidence that the
incapacitated individual likely would have approved the transaction.
A comparison of two cases illustrates competing views of whether conflict of interest
rules can be flexibly applied in the family context. In Fielder v. Howell,56 the guardian cashed in
a certificate of deposit held in joint tenancy with her husband and her incapacitated mother,
acquired long before the guardianship. The Kansas court declined to find a breach of duty,
rejecting the claim by the guardian’s brother that the funds should be recovered by their mother’s
estate. In rejecting the conflict of interest claim, the court pointed to the guardian’s (and her
husband’s) pre-appointment survivor rights to those proceeds, her spending of proceeds on her
mother, and her preservation of her mother’s other properties. In contrast, a Nebraska case
illustrates an inflexible application of the no-conflict rules.57 In Conservatorship of Hanson, the
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protected adult and his wife (both in second marriages) agreed years before the guardianship was
created that he would reimburse her monthly for the added expense of his living in her home.
After he became incapacitated, his wife (now guardian) continued to receive payments until he
died, without prior judicial authorization.58 After the husband’s death, his children from his first
marriage sought to recover the payments received during the period of guardianship.59 The court
held the wife-guardian liable on the basis of self-dealing, and disgorged those payments from
her.60 In so ruling, the court attributed no relevance to “family financial management in the
family’s accustomed manner” or a lack of any sinister motive on the part of the wife-guardian.61
The doctrine of substituted judgment and its modern statutory variations offer some
accommodation of past understandings between the incapacitated adult and her guardian by
seeking to effectuate the likely preferences of the adult when she was competent. See Chapter _.
Under this doctrine, a guardian can to seek prior judicial authorization of a transaction that
violates the conflict of interest prohibition but represents the incapacitated individual’s wishes or
past practices,62 such as a gift to the family guardian or another relative or an expenditure of the
guardianship funds for the mutual benefit of the adult and her guardian.63 The substitutedjudgment doctrine provides procedures for the family guardian to legitimize the transaction ex
ante and for the court to evaluate evidence of past practices or expression of preferences, as well
as the impact of the transaction.64 But the statutory requirement of prior authorization may
invalidate any unauthorized transactions, although family guardians (such as Ms. Hanson,65
supra) may be unaware of their obligation to get court approval for what likely seems like a
routine transaction. Perhaps for this reason, some courts allow guardians to defend unauthorized
transactions ex post.66
The imposition of burdensome reporting requirements and strict conflict of interest rules
on family guardians is often justified by features of this fiduciary relationship that distinguish it
from that of parents and children. But when a history of intimacy and harmony has characterized
58
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the family relationship, strict enforcement and reluctance to allow family guardians to act on preappointment practices or understandings or to share the incapacitated individual’s resources may
harm the individual’s autonomy and welfare and discourage well-intended family members from
providing guardianship services. Moreover, insistence on allowing conflicts only with prior
authorization ignores the reality that unsophisticated family guardians often lack legal assistance
until they are sued. Thus, fiduciary law can be intrusive and demoralizing if applied without
flexibility to close family guardian relationships.
E. Termination
A guardian may be removed from her office if she has neglected her duties. See Chapter
_. Again, family guardians receive no special consideration in removal proceedings based on
alleged misconduct and have been removed on grounds of abuse/neglect,67 self-dealing,68 and
failure to report.69 For example, an Illinois court removed a well-intended mother-guardian and
long-term carer of an incapacitated adult on grounds of poor compliance with reporting and noconflict duties.70 But the importance to the adult of the relationship with the guardian can be
considered in the decision. Thus, a close family bond can weigh against termination if the court
views removal of the guardian as harmful to the adult.71
V. Family Guardians of Adults with Intellectual Disabilities
When an intellectually disabled child reaches the age of majority (usually 18), parental
authority ends. The individual is assumed to be competent to function as a legal adult unless a
guardianship is established. Often a parent will petition to become the guardian for the severely
disabled person, to retain decision-making authority, and to obtain access to healthcare and other
benefits.72 This form of guardianship differs from family guardianships involving elderly adults
in several ways: First, it typically is initiated to allow continuation of the pre-appointment,
parent-minor child relationship for an individual who is unable to function as an adult. Second,
the individual typically lives with the guardian, not necessarily the case with an elderly protected
adult. Third, although the individual usually has preferences and values that should guide the
67
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guardian’s choices, she has a less developed interest in personal autonomy than an elderly person
who has functioned independently for much of her life. Finally, typically, the intellectually
disabled individual does not have a personal estate (unless she has received a tort judgment).
Despite these differences, most states do not distinguish this relationship from other
guardianships, nor give special weight to the parent’s prior caretaking role in the appointment
process.73 In a few states, however, this form of guardianship is subject to a streamlined
appointment process and to reduced reporting requirements. These accommodations treat
guardianships involving intellectually disabled individuals as an intermediate category between
the fiduciary bond between a parent and minor child and a family guardianship of a formerlycapacitated adult. 74
A. Appointment.
Although a parent of an intellectually disabled adult typically becomes the guardian, most
states create no presumption in favor of appointing the parent,75 and the appointment process is
subject to the same due process requirements as are other guardianships. In New York, in
contrast, a special regime that is simpler and less costly governs this form of guardianship,76 with
the express purpose of providing an efficient means to enable parents of children with
intellectual disabilities to continue their caretaking and decision-making roles when their
children reach majority.77 A diagnosis by specialized healthcare professionals provides
sufficient evidence of incapacity, a hearing is rarely held, and the resulting guardianship is
almost always broad and indefinite.78 Some fiduciary and reporting duties apply, but otherwise
the guardianship largely continues the relationship between the parent and the minor disabled
child.79
B. Application of Fiduciary Duties.
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Family guardianships involving intellectually disabled adults generally are subject to the
same fiduciary duties as other guardianships, but some states give limited recognition to the
special characteristics of these guardianships. Accommodation of reporting requirements is most
common, in part because intellectually disabled adults often have few assets. A few statutes
dispense with the burden of annual reporting, particularly if the adult’s only source of income is
social security benefits.80 Moreover, guardians may have reduced reporting duties under statutes
that adjust this burden according to the size of the estate or the frequency of transactions. Under
Kentucky’s statute, for example, the guardian of estate is permitted to file informal biennial
reports if the guardianship estate comprises a small amount of personal property and no real
property.81
Courts often apply the rule against self-dealing strictly against the parent guardian,
however, when an intellectually disabled adult has a substantial estate. For example, an Illinois
court considered a case in which the adult had a substantial estate resulting from a medical
malpractice settlement for birth injuries. She lived with her mother, who was her primary
caregiver and became the guardian of her estate when she reached majority. Without prior
authorization and proper record-keeping, the mother-guardian purchased a family home, using
funds from the guardianship estate to pay the down payment and mortgage repayments, and paid
vehicle expenses for the family car and a caregiver’s salary to herself. The mother was removed
as guardian notwithstanding the “excellent care” that she had provided to her daughter for her
whole life. The court held the mother in breach of fiduciary duty for using funds from the
guardianship estate to benefit the family as a whole, rather than her daughter separately.82
This decision seems to ignore the reality that the interests of some adults with intellectual
disabilities, like those of minor children, are intertwined with the interests of the parent who
provides ongoing care. Parents who continue the role of caring for their disabled child may be
unsophisticated about the heightened fiduciary duties they assume as guardians. Although
advocates raise legitimate concerns about the threat to the disabled young adult’s emerging
interest in self-determination,83 it is important not to ignore the value to her of life-long family
bonds. Informal social norms may be powerful regulators of parents in this context and the
80
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burdens of care are sometimes more onerous than with younger children. For these reasons,
reducing the guardian’s burden and enhancing relationship rewards may often benefit the adult
subject to guardianship.
VI. Conclusion
The goal of family law is to encourage family members to care for one another, and
particularly to induce parents to care for their children and to act in their children’s interests.
Surrogacy law similarly aims to induce the guardian to act to serve the interest of the protected
person and not her selfish interests. In both fiduciary contexts, bonding and monitoring
mechanisms function to align the interests of agent and principal. As this chapter shows, family
law relies heavily on informal enforcement mechanisms in most intact families, while
recognizing that affective bonds and informal social norms are sometimes ineffective, especially
after family dissolution. Surrogacy law, in contrast, encourages satisfactory performance by
guardians through formal monitoring mechanisms, in the form of reporting requirements, and
bonding mechanisms, represented by conflict of interest rules. While this regulatory regime
generally serves the interests of the adult subject to guardianship and deters self-interested
behavior by her guardian, this chapter proposes that in the context of close family relationships,
formal legal regulation can sometimes be applied more flexibly to the ultimate benefit of the
adult.
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